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Impact of external assurance on corporate climate change 




Purpose: The purpose of this research is to examine the impact of external assurance on the level of voluntary 
corporate climate change disclosures by Finnish firms.  
Design/methodology/approach: The sample of this study includes 228 firm-year observations over the period 
2008-2015 for listed Finnish companies that have issued sustainability reports and responded to the Carbon 
Disclosure Project (CDP) questionnaire at least once during the sample period. We conduct a panel regression 
analysis to study the afore-mentioned linkage. In addition, the Tobit regression model is also estimated to 
check the robustness of our findings.   
Findings: The findings suggest that assurance has a highly significant positive impact on the level of corporate 
climate change disclosures even after controlling for the effect of a number of control variables. Moreover, 
among the control variables, firm size and asset age are found to have significant effect on the extent of carbon 
emissions disclosure. Furthermore, the additional analysis reveals that the type of assurance providers 
(accounting firms vs non-accounting firms) and the type of financial auditors (Big4 financial auditors vs non-
Big4 financial auditors) do not influence the level of climate change disclosure of assured companies. 
Research limitations/implications: This research is subject to certain limitations. First, the source of the data 
used in this research is the CDP database which has limitations in that it is a voluntary disclosure process 
where all the observations collected are self-reported by the responding firms. This may bias the reported 
findings. Second, our sample includes only listed companies and hence the results might have limited 
explanatory capacity for unlisted firms. 
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Practical implications: By using the results of this research, corporate managers will be able to reduce the 
information asymmetry between various stakeholders and them through disclosure of accurate, reliable and 
credible environmental information. Such disclosures will, in turn, allow socially responsible investors to 
choose eco-friendly investments and will thus enable them to make appropriate investment decisions. 
Originality/value: Research on the external assurance-corporate climate change disclosure nexus is scarce. 
This study addresses this gap in the nonfinancial disclosure assurance literature by demonstrating that external 
assurance increases the level of voluntary corporate climate change disclosure. Drawing on stakeholder-agency 
theory, this study views external assurance as a monitoring structure that potentially curbs the monitoring 
problem between corporate managers and other stakeholders and increases the amount of climate change 
disclosures making a possible avenue for the reduction of the information asymmetry between them. 
Keywords: External assurance; Climate change disclosure; Stakeholder-agency theory; Monitoring structure; 
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1. Introduction 
Corporate climate change disclosure practices are a subset of corporate environmental disclosure 
practices (Haque & Deegan, 2010; Luo, 2019; Stanny & Ely, 2008). Corporate climate change 
disclosure has become particularly important as it can meet the information-need of various 
stakeholder groups, who are increasingly demanding that companies publicly disclose the 
impacts of their business practices on climate change (Cotter & Najah, 2011; Haque & Deegan, 
2010). For instance, Stanny & Ely (2008, p. 338) report that in October 2007, a group of 
stakeholders (consisting of state officials and institutional investors representing more than 1.5 
trillion USD in assets) petitioned the US Securities and Exchange Commission to issue an 
interpretive release „clarifying that material climate-related information must be included in 
corporate disclosures under existing law‟; Stanny and Ely (2008, p. 338) inform further that this 
group called not only for disclosure by high-emission firms “but also for low-emission firms to 
disclose information about estimated future physical and regulatory risks from climate change”. 
This incident corroborates the growing concern over the issue of climate change as well as the 
development of environmental consciousness of the public. T 
he plausible reason for the growing concern over the issue of climate change may be the 
numerous impacts of climate change on ecosystems and subsequently on human lives 
(Giannarakis et al., 2017). Climate change is exacerbated by global warming (Jones, 2010) and 
global warming is believed to be principally caused by greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 
(Giannarakis et al., 2017; Liao et al., 2015). Corporations are expected to play an important role 
in stabilizing climate change (Hossain et al., 2017) as corporate business and assets are in large 
part responsible for increasingly severe climate change (Liao et al., 2015). The growing public 
concern over the issue of climate change has led firms to adopt environment-friendly strategies 
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(e.g., initiation of green practices) contributing to the global target of reducing GHG emissions 
(Giannarakis et al., 2017) and created the demand for increased information transparency for the 
climate change issue (Liao et al., 2015); failure to meet this demand on the part of organizations 
will prevent various stakeholders from assessing the risks that climate change poses to the 
respective organizations (Haque & Deegan, 2010). In order to meet the information-need of 
stakeholders, companies are voluntarily and increasingly, in their annual reports or stand-alone 
environmental or sustainability reports, disclosing environmental information that also includes 
climate change-related information (e.g., climate change policy, amount of GHG emissions, 
initiatives for reducing GHG emissions, initiatives for improving energy efficiency, use of clean 
energy sources such as biofuel etc.) (Braam et al., 2016; Giannarakis et al., 2017).  
Braam et al. (2016) claim that companies may use corporate environmental disclosure as a 
management tool and argue that through disclosure of environmental information, good 
environmental performers may send signals to stakeholders about their success in environmental 
performance (EP) and seriousness towards sustainable development; on the other hand, poor 
environmental performers may seek legitimacy of their business activities through such 
disclosures. Further, Braam et al. (2016) contend that companies may try to change public 
perceptions rather than disclose actual EP by providing environment-related information; for 
example, companies with poor EP may self-servingly prefer to disclose information about only 
good EP rather than provide information on both good and bad EP in a balanced report (Braam 
& Peeters, 2018, Cho et al., 2012). The results of the study undertaken by Braam et al. (2016) 
confirm that companies with poorer environmental performance in terms of GHG emissions tend 
to disclose more environmental information than companies that emit lower amount of 
greenhouse gases in order to gain legitimacy. The tendency of companies to manage public 
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perceptions rather than reveal actual EP through environmental disclosures raises a great concern 
about the accuracy, reliability and credibility of the EP information disclosed (Braam et al., 
2016). In response to such concern, companies are increasingly inclined to have their 
environmental information assured by independent assurance providers (Braam & Peeters, 2018; 
Junior et al., 2014).  
As far as assurance of corporate climate change disclosures is concerned, there is an increased 
international demand for such assurance; the release of ISAE 3410 Assurance Engagements on 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions by the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board 
(IAASB) (International Federation of Accountants (IFAC), 2012) and the development of carbon 
pricing and emission trading schemes (ETS)-such as the European Union ETS, New Zealand 
ETS and the Australian Carbon Pricing Mechanism have escalated the demand for verification 
and assurance of carbon-related disclosures (Green & Taylor, 2013). Moreover, previous studies 
confirm that independent third-party assurance enhances the credibility of non-financial 
disclosures (e.g., corporate climate change disclosures) and subsequently builds corporate 
reputation (Giannarakis et al., 2018; Moroney et al., 2012; Pflugrath et al., 2011; Reimsbach et 
al., 2018; Simnett et al., 2009). Giannarakis et al. (2018) suggest that independent assessment of 
environmental initiatives prevents companies from manipulating the dissemination of climate 
change information; furthermore, external assurance plays an important role in the evaluation of 
risks and concerns relating to climate change and thus improves environmental reporting 
transparency on the adoption of climate change mitigation strategies. Despite the importance of 
and the growing demand for external assurance of GHG emissions information, there has been 
little research investigating the relationship between external assurance and the level of climate 
change-related disclosures (Giannarakis et al., 2018). This study, using a sample of 228 
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observations from 37 listed Finnish companies during the period 2008-2015, addresses this 
lacuna by examining the impact of external assurance on corporate climate change disclosures in 
a voluntary context.    
For this research, Finland remains the geographical area of interest for two reasons. First, 
Finland has an active role in climate change policy. Climate change policies are being made at 
the international, European Union (EU) and national levels. At the international level, Finland 
has ratified the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1994 
and the Kyoto Protocol (KP) in 2002 together with other EU countries. The KP supplements the 
UNFCCC and specifies the obligations in decreasing GHG emissions of the countries that are 
parties to it. In addition, Finland being a member state of the EU is also committed to the EU‟s 
policy objectives on climate change. Furthermore, Finland has a strong national climate change 
policy which is based on international and EU climate change policies. The national Climate 
Change Act (609/2015) of Finland entered into force on June 1, 2015 and was followed by the 
introduction of the first medium-term climate change policy plan “Towards Climate-Smart Day-
to-Day Living” on September 14, 2017. The medium-term climate change policy plan was 
adopted by the Parliament in March 2018. The national Climate Change Act (609/2015) has set 
the long-term target of reducing all types of GHG emissions by at least 80% by 2050, compared 
to 1990; on the other hand, the medium-term climate change policy plan aims at reducing GHG 
emissions by 16% in the non-emissions trading sectors (compared to 1990) and by 21% in the 
emissions trading sectors (compared to 2005) by 2020
1
. Every year Finland obligatorily reports 
to the European Commission and the UNFCCC Secretariat on progress made in the reduction of 
GHG emissions.  
                                                          
1 This information is sourced from http://www.ym.fi/en-
US/The_environment/Climate_and_air/Mitigation_of_climate_change/National_climate_policy. 
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Second, Finland is severely affected by global climate change
2
. Finland‟s climate is warming at a 
faster rate; within the last hundred years, the country has experienced an increase in the average 
temperature by one degree Celsius, mainly due to global climate change whereas the global 
average temperature is 0.85
0




. According to the Arctic 
Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA), the annual average temperature in the Arctic region 
(including Finland) has increased at almost twice the rate of the rest of the world. As a 
consequence, in Finland by 2025 the average temperature is projected to rise slightly over 2 °C 
relative to 1961-1990. The analysis also indicates that the average temperature is projected to rise 
by 4 to 6 °C and average precipitation by 15 to 25 per cent by the 2080s compared to the period 
1961-1990. Temperatures will rise the most in winter and precipitation also increases especially 
in winter. Forsius et al. (2013), for example, also document that climate change predictions for 
Finland indicate an increase in precipitation of 5–40% and in air temperature of 2–78C by the 
2080s
4
. The impacts of changes in the climate are already visible in Finland
2
. For example, many 
northern and southern species that inhabit Finland are affected by climate change; in winter, 
many snow and ice-dependent species are at risk of disappearing altogether and in the spring and 
summer, the probability of forest fires increases
1
; there is also a probability that river, lake and 
sea ice will break up earlier
5
. Besides, Palsa mires in Lapland may be destroyed and hence, 
snow-related winter tourism suffers in southern Finland. In addition, need for energy for cooling 
of buildings increases in summer as well. 
                                                          
2 This information is sourced from http://www.ymparistotiedonfoorumi.fi/puheenvuorot/ilmastonmuutos-haastaa-perinteisen-
luonnonsuojelun/. 
3 This information is sourced from https://ec.europa.eu/clima/change/causes_en. 
4 In order to lessen the adverse impact of traditional energy usage on climate change, the Finnish government policy aims to 
increase the use of renewable energy to 38% of energy consumption by 2020 and to 60% by 2050 (Climate and Energy Strategy 
2008). 
5 This information is sourced from http://www.environment.fi/en-
US/Maps_and_statistics/The_state_of_the_environment_indicators/Climate_change_and_energy/Average_temperature_in_Finla
nd_up_by_one(28736). 
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This paper has several contributions. First, it exclusively focuses on the impact of external 
assurance on the level of corporate climate change disclosure in a voluntary context. Climate 
change is a global phenomenon with a long-term and probably perpetual impact (Datt et al., 
2019; Lash & Wellington, 2007). Corporate business and assets are in large part responsible for 
increasingly severe climate change (Liao et al., 2015). The phenomenon of climate change is 
mainly caused by GHG emissions (Giannarakis et al., 2017; Liao et al., 2015) that are subject to 
different regulations (Luo, 2019). All these issues differentiate climate change from other 
environmental problems companies contribute to and make disclosure of climate change-related 
information unique among environmental disclosures (Luo, 2019). In addition, companies 
increasingly signal their green credentials through climate change disclosures (Chithambo & 
Tauringana, 2014; Rankin et al., 2011; Peters & Romi, 2015). Furthermore, the development of a 
separate carbon assurance standard (titled ISAE 3410 Assurance on a Greenhouse Gas 
Statement) by the IFAC through its International Auditing and Assurance Standards 
Board (IAASB), emphasizes the probability that corporate climate change disclosure and 
assurance of such disclosure may become a standard practice in a low-carbon economy and 
facilitate stakeholders‟ decision-making (Datt et al., 2019). Nevertheless, prior studies have not 
paid much attention to the linkage between carbon assurance and the level of voluntary climate 
change disclosure and have principally examined the effect of external assurance on the broader 
subject-matters of sustainability or environmental disclosure (e.g., Hassan et al., 2019; Braam et 
al., 2016; Moroney et al., 2012). Our study fills this gap in the existing literature. 
Second, this study addresses the need for further research highlighted by Giannarakis et al. 
(2018), the only study that examines the effect of external assurance (in addition to other factors 
such as government ownership and corporate environmental performance) on corporate climate 
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change disclosure. Using cross-sectional data of 2014, Giannarakis et al. (2018) find a positive 
influence of external assurance and government ownership and a negative effect of corporate 
environmental performance on climate change disclosure. While these findings provide 
important insights into the determinants of corporate voluntary climate change disclosure, 
Giannarakis et al. (2018) underline the importance of longitudinal research to discover any 
potentially continued impact of external assurance on corporate carbon disclosures over a longer 
time period. This empirical research complements the work of Giannarakis et al. (2018) by using 
panel data covering a longer time period in order to understand whether external assurance has a 
sustained influence on the dissemination level of climate change-related information when 
multiple time periods are considered. Furthermore, this research supplements Giannarakis et al. 
(2018) by investigating the impact of type of assurance provider (professional accounting firms 
or consulting firms) and type of financial auditor (Big4 or non-Big4 accounting firms) on 
corporate voluntary carbon disclosures.  
Third, based on authors‟ knowledge this is the initial study to use, as a proxy for the level of 
corporate climate change disclosures, both numeric and letter scores awarded (by the Carbon 
Disclosure Project (CDP)) to companies responding to a standard questionnaire set by the CDP. 
The CDP uses the questionnaire in order to conduct a survey investigating corporate carbon 
emissions. In 2016, the CDP adopted a new scoring methodology and started awarding only 
letter scores instead of both numeric and letter scores (as it used to award till 2015) to companies 
that participated in the survey. Before 2016, numeric scores would merely measure corporate 
climate change disclosures whereas letter scores were a measure of both corporate environmental 
performance in terms of corporate carbon emissions and corporate climate change disclosures 
(CDP, 2008; Guenther et al., 2016). The letter score introduced in 2016 measures both corporate 
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carbon performance and climate change disclosures (CDP, 2016). Previous studies have 
considered either numeric scores (e.g., Luo, 2019) or letter scores (e.g., Giannarakis et al., 2018) 
awarded before 2016 as a proxy for the level of corporate climate change disclosures in their 
analyses. In contrast to earlier studies, this empirical research uses both numeric scores (for the 
period 2008-2015) and letter scores (for the period 2016-2018 in the additional analysis).  
Fourth, on the theoretical front, this study adds to the sustainability assurance literature by 
employing stakeholder-agency theory to understand the impact of external assurance on 
corporate voluntary climate change reporting. Tyson & Adams (2020) suggest that prior research 
has applied several organizational theories (namely, agency, contingency, gatekeeping, 
institutional, legitimacy, stakeholder, strong structuration, and transformational leadership) to 
provide insights into the phenomenon of sustainability assurance. But drawing on stakeholder-
agency theory, this empirical work views, for the first time (to the best of the authors‟ 
knowledge), external assurance as a monitoring structure (the concept developed by Hill & Jones 
(1992) in their proposed theory) in order to understand its impact on the extent of corporate 
voluntary climate change disclosure. 
Finally, the results of this Finnish study may be valid for other EU countries given that all the 
EU countries are affected by the EU‟s recommendations for fighting climate change. Besides 
some EU countries have financial markets and legal systems similar to those of Finland as well.  
This paper proceeds as follows. The next section attempts to contain a comprehensive literature 
review. Section 3 discusses the relevant theory for this research and subsequently, the hypothesis 
is developed. Section 4 outlines the research methods. Our empirical results are discussed in 
Section 5. The final section concludes the paper.  
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2. Literature Review  
Recent years have witnessed a worldwide increase in the publication of sustainability reports 
(Radhouane et al., 2020; Sellami et al., 2019; Jones et al., 2015; KPMG, 2013). The growth in 
the publication of such reports can be attributed to stakeholders‟ increasing interest in 
sustainability information (of which climate change-related information is a part) (Datt et al., 
2019; Wong et al., 2016) and the consequent awareness of companies of their responsibility for 
sustainability (Gillet-Monjarret, 2018; Jones et al., 2015). Keeping pace with the growing public 
interest in companies‟ commitment towards the broader issues of sustainability, the societal 
concern regarding global climate change (resulting from the increase in average temperature of 
the Earth‟s surface due to the concentration of GHGs in the atmosphere) has also escalated 
because of its potential adverse impact on human life and the natural environment (Giannarakis 
et al., 2017; Martinov-Bennie, 2012) and such concern has emphasized the need for disclosure of 
climate change-related information by companies (Datt et al., 2019; Zhou et al., 2016; Martinov-
Bennie, 2012; Thornton & Hsu, 2001). In addition, corporate climate change-related information 
has become extremely important to stakeholders‟ decision-making processes (Datt et al., 2019; 
Green et al., 2017; Stanny & Ely, 2008; Thornton & Hsu, 2001). This has led to an increase in 
both voluntary and mandatory carbon emissions disclosure (Green et al., 2017). 
However, stakeholders tend to mistrust the disclosed information relating to climate change 
because the discretionary nature of carbon emissions disclosure, managerial incentives to 
manipulate such disclosure and the lack of an internationally recognized protocol make the 
quality and reliability of corporate climate change-related disclosures questionable (Datt et al., 
2019; Kolk et al., 2008). The existing literature suggests that the procurement of external 
assurance (by an independent third party) of nonfinancial information (including climate change-
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related information along with other sustainability information) adds credibility and reliability to 
the disclosed information and enhances stakeholders‟ confidence therein (Wong et al., 2016; 
Zhou et al., 2016; Gillet-Monjarret, 2012; Manetti & Toccafondi, 2012; Moroney et al., 2012; 
Pflugrath et al., 2011). Hence, in order to increase stakeholders‟ trust in the credibility of 
disclosed nonfinancial information (Radhouane et al., 2020; Clarkson et al., 2019; Datt et al., 
2019; Zhou et al., 2016; Gillet-Monjarret, 2018, 2015; Green & Li, 2012; Huggins et al., 2011; 
Simnett et al., 2009), companies are increasingly procuring assurance of two types of 
nonfinancial disclosure: assurance of the broad-ranging subject matter of sustainability 
disclosure and assurance of an organization‟s disclosure of climate change-related information 
(Zhou et al., 2016; Cohen & Simnett, 2015). 
The escalating demand for external assurance of nonfinancial disclosure has attracted much 
research attention that has recently led to an increase in the number of studies exploring such 
kind of assurance (Rossi & Tarquinio, 2017). Several of these studies have examined the impact 
of external assurance on firm valuation and cost of equity capital of disclosing firms (e.g., 
Radhouane et al., 2020; Clarkson et al., 2019; Hassan et al., 2019; Weber, 2018; Fazzini & 
Maso, 2016; Cho et al., 2014 and so on). On the contrary, only a handful of studies (e.g., Hassan 
et al., 2019; Giannarakis et al., 2018; Braam et al., 2016; Moroney et al., 2012) have 
investigated the effect of external assurance on the level of dissemination of nonfinancial 
information (that includes climate change-related information and other sustainability 
information).  
Although the empirical research on the effect of external assurance on firm valuation and cost of 
equity capital has produced mixed results, the outcomes of the studies examining the impact of 
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external assurance on the disclosure of nonfinancial information have converged confirming that 
external assurance positively affects the level of nonfinancial disclosure. 
 
As far as corporate nonfinancial information is concerned, corporate climate change-related 
information differs from other sustainability information (e.g., information relating to 
environmental issues other than the issue of climate change) because it includes GHG 
information, which is more similar (when compared to other nonfinancial information) to 
financial information due to its quantifiable nature (Zhou et al., 2016). Given the uniqueness and 
distinctiveness of corporate climate change-related information and the growth in demand for 
assurance of such information, the IAASB issued a separate assurance standard titled ISAE 3410 
Assurance Engagements on Greenhouse Gas Emissions (IFAC, 2012) even in the presence of 
ISAE 3000 (Revised) Assurance Engagements Other Than Audits or Reviews of Historical 
Financial Information, which is applicable to the assurance of general sustainability information 
(Zhou et al., 2016). The ISAE 3410 emphasizes the need for the carrying out of the assurance of 
carbon emissions disclosure either as part of the assurance of a sustainability report/annual report 
or on a standalone GHG report (Datt et al., 2019).  
 
It is noteworthy that regardless of the growth in the demand for assurance of carbon emissions 
disclosure and the release of the ISAE 3410 by the IAASB, only one study (Giannarakis et al., 
2018) has been found inquiring into the impact of external assurance on the level of corporate 
climate change disclosure, while other studies (Hassan et al., 2019; Braam et al., 2016; Moroney 
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et al., 2012) have examined the effect of external assurance on the level of the broader subject 
matter of sustainability disclosure or environmental disclosure
6
.  
However, Giannarakis et al. (2018) has used cross-sectional data relating to the year 2014 for 
215 European companies in order to examine the influence of the broad-ranging environmental 
assurance on the dissemination level of corporate climate change-related information. The 
companies studied by Giannarakis et al. (2018) have purchased environmental assurance, which 
is intended for enhancing the credibility of environmental disclosures, a broader subject matter 
that includes corporate climate change disclosures (Luo, 2019; Haque & Deegan, 2010; Stanny 
& Ely, 2008). Consequently, in case the environmental assurance process has covered only 
specific sections of corporate sustainability/environmental/social responsibility reports, it is 
possible that the assurance scope may have missed out climate change disclosures. Furthermore, 
the use of cross-sectional data by Giannarakis et al. (2018) demonstrates that external assurance 
positively affects corporate climate change disclosure level during a single time period; but this 
result does not confirm that external assurance has a sustained influence on the dissemination 
level of climate change-related information when multiple time periods are considered. In other 
words, there is a lack of evidence that the outcome of Giannarakis et al. (2018) holds true over a 
longer period of time with external assurance impacting the evolution of corporate climate 
change disclosure (in terms of increase in the quantity of such disclosure) over time.  
Hence, a unique opportunity exists to examine the impact of external assurance on the level of 
carbon emissions disclosure given that external assurance covers, at a minimum, climate change-
                                                          
6 Due to the growing concern about the issue of climate change, a number of studies have been undertaken analyzing corporate 
climate change disclosures. These studies broadly fall into two groups: while one group of research has examined the company 
specific determinants of corporate climate change disclosures, another group of studies has investigated the effect of different 
corporate governance characteristics on the dissemination of climate change information (Kılıç & Kuzey, 2019). Table 1 
summarizes notable works from both groups. The summaries in Table 1 witness the scarcity of research investigating the impact 
of voluntary external assurance on the extent of corporate climate change disclosures. 
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related information. We use panel data covering a period of eight years (2008-2015) and extend 
the prior research by investigating whether external assurance has a continued effect on the 
extent of GHG disclosure. Additionally, in order to gain a holistic understanding of the 
phenomenon of third-party assurance, we inquire into the linkage between the types of assurance 
provider (accountant versus non-accountant assurance provider and in case the assurance 
provider is an accounting firm, whether it is a Big4 auditing firm) and the level of corporate 
climate change disclosure.     
Furthermore, it is also evident from the summaries in Table 1 that climate change disclosure 
practices in Nordic countries remain under-researched, albeit Nordic countries are committed to 
tackling the climate crisis and advocate for a carbon-neutral society.
7
 Niskala & Pretes (1995) 
and Gonzalez-Gonzalez & Ramírez (2016) assert that the provision of environmental 
information is dependent on the country under consideration because prior country-specific 
studies have produced very different results for different countries (e.g., Roberts, 1991; Gray et 
al., 1995; De Villiers & Van Staden, 2006). Therefore, Nordic countries deserve special research 
attention vis-à-vis carbon disclosures and this empirical work, being the first of its kind to 
exclusively use the Finnish context (Finland being one of the five Nordic countries), addresses 
this issue.      
3. Theoretical Framework and Hypothesis Development 
A firm has a number of stakeholders that include shareholders, managers, employees, customers, 
suppliers, lenders, local communities and the general public (Hill & Jones, 1992). Different 
stakeholders provide different types of resources to the firm and have different expectations in 
                                                          
7 This Information is sourced from https://www.environment.fi/en-
US/Climate_and_air/Nordic_countries_agree_on_closer_coopera(49105).   
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exchange of the resources supplied. For example, shareholders provide capital to the firm in the 
hope that the return on their investment will be maximized; managers and employees serve the 
firm as human capital and expect fair income and appropriate working conditions in return; local 
communities provide locations and a local infrastructure to the firm and the general public, 
through payment of taxes, provides a national infrastructure to the firm and both of these 
stakeholders want the firm either to enhance the quality of life or to abstain from causing harm to 
the same through its business activities (Hill & Jones, 1992). In case stakeholders‟ interests are 
not served, they may refuse to provide resources to the firm (e.g., shareholders may sell their 
shares in case of poor financial performance of the firm; employees and managers may leave the 
firm if they do not receive fair pay and have appropriate working conditions; the local 
communities may refuse to provide locations and local infrastructures to the firm for continuing 
its business operations if its business activities cause damage to the quality of life etc.) and thus 
threaten its survival.  
Stakeholder-agency theory suggests that a firm is a nexus of implicit and explicit contracts 
among all these stakeholders; managers are unique stakeholders as they are at the center of the 
nexus of contracts (i.e., managers have contractual relationships with all kinds of stakeholders 
and thus work as „agents‟ for them.) and have a „direct control over the decision-making 
apparatus of the firm‟ (Hill & Jones, 1992, p. 134). Therefore, it is imperative that managers 
make strategic decisions and allocate resources in a way that serves the interests of other 
stakeholders.  
Managers also have control over critical information and consequently, they are able to filter or 
even distort the type of information they release to other stakeholders. This gives rise to an 
information asymmetry between managers and other stakeholders making it difficult for 
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stakeholders to assess whether managers are working to serve their interests. As an obvious 
response to this situation, stakeholders can undertake their own monitoring of management 
performance by collecting themselves necessary information on management activities, but the 
cost of gathering such information may be exorbitant. This is particularly true in a situation 
termed „stakeholder diffusion‟ (Hill & Jones, 1992), where many individuals or entities 
constitute a stakeholder group (that excludes managers) and no one of them has control over a 
substantial portion of the group‟s total resources. Under these circumstances, no single 
stakeholder (of the stakeholder group) may be able to sponsor the substantial task of collecting 
and analyzing information required for the significant reduction of the information asymmetry 
between managers and stakeholders. Consequently, stakeholders (of the stakeholder group) may 
have to bear an increased residual loss as stakeholder diffusion confers on managers greater 
discretionary control over the use of the firm‟s resources. This situation calls for the 
establishment of institutional structures, which Hill & Jones (1992) refer to as „monitoring 
structures‟, for monitoring management performance. Examples of monitoring structures include 
mandatory requirements of the publication of audited consolidated financial statements by public 
companies and evolution of non-profit monitoring organizations such as Consumer Watch and 
labor unions that keep an eye on the extent to which managers serve the interests of certain 
stakeholders (Hill & Jones, 1992, p. 140).  
As far as dissemination of climate change-related information is concerned, external assurance 
can serve as a useful control mechanism or „monitoring structure‟ (Simnett et al., 2009). Prior 
studies (e.g., Abdel-khalik, 1993; Blackwell et al., 1998; Dixon et al., 2004; Hasan et al., 2003; 
Hodge et al., 2009; Simnett et al., 2009) confirm that the assurance function undertaken by an 
independent third party plays the role of a control mechanism by enhancing the credibility of 
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disclosed information and engendering greater trust of stakeholders. Given that climate change 
disclosures (like other items of sustainability disclosures) are mostly voluntary and guided by 
limited reporting guidelines (Hodge et al., 2009), stakeholders are likely to lack faith in the 
disseminated carbon-related information. As such, the third-party verification of the carbon 
emissions information can restore stakeholders‟ confidence in the information released.  
Moreover, the growing public concern over environmental issues such as climate change has led 
to the emergence of a number of new stakeholders (e.g., environmental NGOs, green investment 
funds and green consumers), who pressure companies to become more responsible for the impact 
of their operations on the natural environment and disseminate credible and reliable information 
on their environmental activities (Hodge et al., 2009; Moroney et al., 2012). Furthermore, 
traditional stakeholders such as shareholders have also become concerned about corporate EP 
along with corporate financial performance, a fact that is evidenced by the growth and 
emergence of sustainable investment funds and superannuation funds (Van der Laan et al., 2008; 
Moroney et al., 2012). The existing literature also indicates that independent assurance reduces 
information asymmetry between managers and other stakeholders (Watts & Zimmerman, 1986; 
Wallace, 1987; Carey et al., 2000). Hence external assurance of environmental disclosures can 
be viewed as a „monitoring structure‟ (as referred to by Hill & Jones, 1992) that aids in reducing 
the information asymmetry between managers and other stakeholders and thus increases the 
credibility of the reported environmental information including climate change-related 
information and engenders stakeholders‟ confidence. Therefore, stakeholder-agency theory 
appositely explains the association between external assurance and the extent of corporate 
climate change disclosures. 
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As a monitoring structure, external assurance not only improves the processes of collecting data 
relating to environmental issues such as carbon emissions (Jones & Solomon, 2010; O‟Dwyer et 
al., 2011) but also discovers material errors in and omissions of the environmental information 
prepared including climate change-related information and thus increases the quantity of the 
disclosed information (Hodge et al., 2009). The standing literature provides evidence in support 
of the existence of a positive link between external assurance and the level of non-financial 
disclosures (e.g., environmental disclosures including climate change disclosures, social 
disclosures etc.): for example, based on a sample of 74 observations of Australian listed 
companies between 2003 and 2007, Moroney et al. (2012) report a positive association between 
external assurance and the quality and quantity of environmental disclosure. In addition, Braam 
et al. (2016) examine the effect of external assurance on the variation in the level of 
environmental disclosure of Dutch companies for the period from 2009 to 2011 and confirm that 
external assurance positively affects the level of environmental disclosures.  
Furthermore, Giannarakis et al. (2018), using a sample of 215 observations of European 
companies of Bloomberg European 500 Index for the economic year 2014, investigate the impact 
of independent assurance on the extent of corporate climate change disclosure. Their results 
reveal a positive connection between independent assurance and corporate climate change 
disclosure. As such, independent third-party verification enhances the quality of non-financial 
disclosures by reducing information asymmetry between managers and other stakeholders 
(Coram et al., 2009; Moroney et al., 2012) and potentially allows stakeholders to make more 
informed decisions while building trust (Mock et al., 2007). Therefore, it is expected that 
companies aiming for reduction of the information asymmetry (between management and other 
stakeholders) relating to carbon emissions and enhancement of the credibility of the reported 
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climate change-related information, would like to have their climate change information assured, 
which would result in an increased level of corporate climate change disclosures. The above 
discussion leads to the formulation of the following hypothesis: 
H1: External assurance of environmental information increases the level of corporate 
climate change disclosures. 
4. Research Methods 
4.1. Sample and data 
For the purpose of testing the hypothesis, our sample includes 228 firm-year observations 
covering an eight-year period (2008-2015) for Finnish companies that were listed on the Nasdaq 
Helsinki at least for one year during this eight-year period and that responded to the CDP 
questionnaire at least once during the sample period. The total number of firm-year observations 
over the eight-year period included in the original sample was 296. The observations are 
screened on the basis of the criterion that a complete set of necessary data (e.g., 
financial/CCDS/external assurance/other) should be available. Observations not meeting this 
criterion are excluded. As a result of this selection process, the total final sample consists of 228 
observations. The number of observations by year is provided in Table 2. The lowest number of 
observations is 19 in 2008 and the highest number of observations is 36 in 2014. The CDP 
questionnaire underwent substantial changes during the period from 2003 to 2006; moreover, 
sustainability professionals were doubtful about the reliability of the information provided 
(Guenther et al., 2016; Kolk et al., 2008). As a result, the CDP had to further develop the 
climate-change questionnaire for enhancing the reliability of the data and the questionnaire did 
not undergo major changes after 2008 (Guenther et al., 2016). Hence, our sample period starts in 
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2008. The sample period ends in 2015 as the CDP has migrated from number score system to 
letter score system in 2016 (CDP, 2016). From 2016, the responding companies, based on their 
assessment across four consecutive levels namely, (a) disclosure; (b) awareness; (c) 
management; and (d) leadership, are awarded any of the eight letter scores that range from A to 
D- (CDP, 2016). According to the new scoring system, a company receiving A or A- will be in 
the Leadership level and on the other hand, a company receiving D or D- will be in the 
Disclosure level (for details, please see Scoring Introduction 2016, CDP).  
Data on climate change disclosure are extracted from CDP climate change reports on Nordic 
countries. Firm specific data are retrieved from Thomson Reuters DataStream database. The data 
on external assurance are retrieved from the corporate sustainability/environmental/social 
responsibility reports of the sampled firms.  
4.2. Variables 
4.2.1. Dependent variable 
The Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) is currently the main global reference as regards corporate 
climate change disclosure (Lee et al., 2015; Luo et al., 2012; Matisoff et al., 2012). In line with 
previous studies, we employ the CDP carbon disclosure score as a proxy for climate change 
disclosure score (CCDS) (Guenther et al., 2016; Prado-Lorenzo & Garcia-Sanchez, 2010; Reid 
& Toffel, 2009; Stanny, 2013). Globally over 4,000 companies are currently responding to the 
CDP questionnaire (Gonzalez-Gonzalez & Ramírez, 2016). Based on the information provided 
by companies regarding four aspects of their climate change management namely, (i) risk and 
opportunities; (ii) emission accounting, verification, and trading; (iii) performance; and (iv) 
governance, companies are given a score that ranges from 0 (for no answers given) to 100 (for 
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complete disclosure) (Gonzalez-Gonzalez & Ramírez, 2016; Guenther et al., 2016). Any 
company that scores above 70 points is considered to have maintained transparency of the 
information provided and believed to be committed to the fight against climate change 
(Gonzalez-Gonzalez & Ramírez, 2016). But the disclosure score measures only disclosure, not 
performance; for example, a company is awarded points for disclosing its GHG emissions, but 
not for the amount of emissions and hence, the carbon disclosure score is not affected by the 
actual amount of emissions (CDP, 2008; Guenther et al., 2016). 
4.2.2. Independent variable 
External assurance (EX_ASSUR) is the variable of interest in this research. EX_ASSUR is coded 
1 for companies with independent third-party assurance of, at a minimum, climate change-related 
information and 0 for companies with unassured climate change-related information 
(Giannarakis et al., 2018; Braam et al., 2016; Moroney et al., 2012).    
4.2.3. Control variables 
In line with previous studies, this paper controls for the effect of a number of variables namely, 
firm size (FSIZE), profitability (PROF), leverage (LEV), industry (IND), asset age (ASST_AGE), 
growth (GRWTH) and research and development intensity (RNDINT).  
Because larger firms have higher visibility than smaller ones (Udayasankar, 2008), they face 
increased public pressure and are subject to greater public scrutiny to show enhanced 
environmental responsiveness (Choi et al., 2013; Yunus et al., 2016). Consequently, they face an 
increased stakeholder demand for information on their environmental and social activities that 
affect the stakeholders‟ welfare (Andrikopoulos & Kriklani, 2013). Hence, a number of previous 
studies used FSIZE as a proxy for organizational visibility in order to explain voluntary 
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environmental disclosure (Brammer & Pavelin, 2006; Choi et al., 2013; Henriques & Sadorsky, 
1999; Sharma & Nguan, 1999). A positive association, as earlier studies suggest (for example, 
Déjean & Martinez, 2009; Giannarakis et al., 2017; Monteiro & Guzmán, 2010), is expected 
between FSIZE and CCDS. FSIZE is measured as the natural logarithm of total assets (Jaggi et 
al., 2018; Kılıç & Kuzey, 2019).  
Previous research suggests that firms in better financial condition (profitable firms) are more 
likely to voluntarily disclose environmental information because such disclosures are a means of 
portraying themselves as environmentally responsive (Cormier et al., 2005). In addition, Choi et 
al. (2013) argue that profitable firms afford to pay the costs of identifying, collecting and 
reporting the information relating to carbon emission. Therefore, a positive association is 
expected between PROF and CCDS. PROF is measured by return on assets (ROA) and 
calculated as the ratio of net income before extraordinary items to total assets (Clarkson et al., 
2008; Jaggi et al., 2018).  
The cases of the Exxon Valdez and BP oil spills, the Union Carbide chemical disaster, and 
American Electric Power‟s emissions litigation (Deegan et al., 2000; Smith et al., 2011) provide 
evidence on the fact that firms‟ financial stability may be affected by environmental issues. 
Moreover, firms are increasingly dependent on creditor funding (Rankin et al., 2011; Neu et al., 
1998) and hence, creditors would expect highly leveraged firms to be socially and 
environmentally responsive and provide more extensive disclosure on their social and 
environmental activities (Roberts, 1992). Therefore, LEV is expected to be positively connected 
to CCDS. LEV is measured by the debt to equity ratio (Jaggi et al., 2018). 
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The findings of prior research reveal that firms in highly polluting industries (or environmentally 
sensitive industries) are likely to disclose more environmental information than those in low 
polluting industries (Chithambo & Tauringana, 2014; Cho & Patten, 2007; Peters & Romi, 
2015). Therefore, a positive linkage is expected between IND and CCDS. Following the existing 
literature (Patten, 2002a; Clarkson et al., 2008; Cho et al., 2014; Yunus et al., 2016), energy, 
utilities, transportation, pharmaceuticals, materials, mining and extractive, paper, chemicals, 
petroleum, metals, utilities and telecommunication industries are considered highly polluting 
industries. IND is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 if a firm operates in a highly 
polluting industry and 0 otherwise (Cho et al., 2014; Yunus et al., 2016; Jaggi et al., 2018). 
In the existing literature, arguments are found in favor of controlling for the effect of the age of 
assets. It is argued that newer assets are more environment friendly as they are less polluting (or 
cleaner) (Clarkson et al., 2008; De Villiers et al., 2011; De Villiers & Van Staden, 2011). 
Therefore, firms owning newer assets will be better environmental performers than those with 
older assets (Clarkson et al., 2008; Cormier & Magnan, 1999; Cormier et al., 2005). Hence, 
Cormier et al., (2005) argue further that the age of assets may be considered to be a proxy for 
corporate environmental performance. In line with this argument, it is expected that firms with 
newer assets will have a higher level of climate change disclosures. The ASST_AGE is calculated 
by the ratio of net property, plant and equipment to gross property, plant and equipment 
(Clarkson et al., 2008).   
Clarkson et al. (2011) assert that firms with superior management capabilities are innovative and 
pursue proactive environmental strategies in order to avoid non-compliance with environmental 
regulations and associated environmental costs in the presence of intense environmental 
regulations. For example, innovative firms would add social and environmental attributes to their 
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products for the purpose of product differentiation, and this process may require them to invest in 
research and development (R&D) projects (Elsayed & Paton, 2005; McWilliams & Siegel, 
2001). This study controls for innovation and employs RNDINT as a proxy for innovation and 
expects a positive association between RNDINT and CCDS. RNDINT is calculated as the ratio of 
total R&D expenditures to annual net sales (Elsayed & Paton, 2005). In addition, prior studies 
confirm that stakeholders and the market expect that fast-growing companies would investment 
more in environmental innovations (Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004; Porter & van der Linde, 1995, 
Skinner & Sloan, 2002). Consequently, this study controls for the effect of GRWTH and expects 
a positive relationship between GRWTH and CCDS. GRWTH is computed as a year-to-year 
percentage change in sales (Clarkson et al., 2011). 
4.2.4. Regression model 
In this research the following regression model has been estimated: 
                                                                     
                                                                        (1) 
where, CCDS=climate change disclosure score (the CDP carbon disclosure score), 
EX_ASSUR=external assurance, FSIZE=firm size, PROF=profitability, LEV=leverage, 
GRWTH=growth, ASST_AGE=asset age, RNDINT=research and development intensity and 
IND=industry. We also control for year effects in our regression model. Table 3 presents the 
summary of the variables that are used in the regression model.  
5. Results and Discussion 
5.1. Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
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The descriptive statistics, reported in Table 4, reveals that CCDS has an average value of 71.12 
and it ranges from 0 to 100 indicating a significant variation across the sample. The mean of the 
independent variable EX_ASSUR is 0.42 which suggests that about 42% of the firms belonging 
to our sample have purchased external assurance for their sustainability reports. The average 
values for the control variables ASST_AGE, FSIZE, RNDINT, LEV, GRWITH and PROF appear 
to be 0.40, 6.42, 0.02, 2.39, 0.01 and 0.06 respectively. Moreover, the mean of the remaining 
control variable industry equals 0.71 implying that 71% of the sample firms belong to the 
environmentally sensitive industry. 
Table 5 exhibits the correlations among the variables under study. These numbers suggest that 
the highest correlation is observed between CCDS and EX_ASSUR. More importantly, the 
association appears to be positive. Similar connections are also detected for the CCDS-FSIZE 
and CCDS-RNDINT pairs. Additionally, a significant negative linkage is seen between CCDS 
and ASST_AGE. We also find that the correlations between CCDS and other control variables are 
found to be insignificant. It is noteworthy that the correlations between assurance and different 
control variables are low. This is also true when pair-wise correlations among the control 
variables are taken into account. The variance inflation factors (VIF) for these variables further 
indicate the nonexistence of multicollinearity. 
5.2. Regression Analysis 
Table 6 displays the results of the fixed effects analysis of our proposed model. We consider the 
fixed effects model as the Hausman test indicates that random effects analysis is inappropriate 
for our data set. Our findings reveal that EX_ASSUR emerges as a major determinant of climate 
change disclosures as the corresponding coefficient is found to be statistically significant at 1% 




. It is further observed that EX_ASSUR has a positive impact on CCDS which supports our 
hypothesis about the association between external assurance and the level of climate change 
disclosures. This result implies that firms having their climate change-related and other 
environmental information externally assured tend to have a higher level of carbon emissions 
disclosure.  
This finding is consistent with that documented by Braam et al. (2016), Giannarakis et al. 
(2018), Hassan et al. (2019) and Moroney et al. (2012) and can be explained in the light of 
stakeholder-agency theory (Hill & Jones, 1992). Stakeholder-agency theory suggests that an 
information asymmetry exists between corporate managers and other stakeholders because 
corporate managers have control over critical information of the firm and they are able to filter or 
distort such information before they communicate it to other stakeholders. Consequently, other 
stakeholders require a control mechanism that will enable them, through provision of an 
increased level of authentic, accurate and reliable information, to identify whether corporate 
managers are serving their (other stakeholders‟) interest. Such a situation necessitates the 
evolution of a wide range of institutional structures, which Hill & Jones (1992) term „monitoring 
structures‟ (Hodge et al., 2009; Jones & Solomon, 2010; O‟Dwyer et al., 2011). In the context of 
corporate climate change disclosures, external assurance can be seen as a monitoring structure 
that can prevent companies from manipulating diffusion of climate change information (hiding 
information about failure to formulate strategies to reduce GHG emissions, for example) 
(Giannarakis et al., 2018), improve the processes of collecting data relating to carbon emissions 
                                                          
8 In order to examine the role of external assurance in explaining the level of climate change disclosure, we have estimated two 
additional models as well. One of these two models includes only EX_ASSUR as the independent variable, whereas the second 
model involves only the control variables. These findings, not reported here, indicate that the R2 statistic tends to increase 
substantially when EX_ASSUR is included in the model. For instance, as suggested by the results of the first model, EX_ASSUR 
alone can explain 24% of the total variation in the dependent variable. For the other model, on the other hand, all the control 
variables account for only 11% of the total variation in CCDS. Moreover, as shown in Table 6, the R2 statistic for the estimated 
model amounts to 32%. The results of additional models are available on request.  
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(Jones & Solomon, 2010; O‟Dwyer et al., 2011), discover material errors in and omissions of 
climate change-related information and thus increase the quantity of the information disclosed 
(Hodge et al., 2009).  
The results of this study also indicate that external assurance potentially serves as an effective 
monitoring structure for Finnish companies causing them to disclose a high level of climate 
change-related information. This increasing trend towards climate change disclosure indicates 
that Finnish companies defer to the pressure of their stakeholders to be more accountable for the 
impact of their activities on the climate and that external assurance, as a monitoring structure, is 
likely to play a crucial role in making companies incorporate in their 
environmental/sustainability report all climate change-related disclosure items that are valuable 
to all stakeholder groups (both shareholders and non-shareholders) leading to an increase in the 
level of climate change disclosures
9
. 
Among the control variables, only FSIZE seems to have a significant effect on CCDS. Other 
control variables appear to be insignificant. FSIZE has a positive coefficient that is statistically 
significant at 10% level. The positive coefficient of FSIZE suggests that larger firms, in 
comparison to smaller ones, disclose more information relating to climate change. This finding is 
consistent with prior research (e.g., Chithambo & Tauringana, 2014; Eleftheriadis & 
Anagnostopoulou, 2015; Freedman & Jaggi, 2005; Gonzales-Gonzales & Ramírez, 2016; Luo et 
al., 2012; Prado-Lorenzo et al., 2009; Stanny & Ely, 2008). Larger firms are under greater 
stakeholder scrutiny (Patten, 2002b) because they undertake more activities that affect the 
                                                          
9
 Given that climate change-related disclosures should be prepared before seeking external assurance service of such disclosures, 
we reproduce the analysis of Table 6 by incorporating a lag of the independent variable (EX_ASSUR). These findings, exhibited 
in Table A2, are consistent with those reported in Table 6. The only discrepancy is that ASST_AGE is now significant, albeit at 
10% level. 
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natural environment and contribute to climate change (Knox et al., 2006). Consequently, 
stakeholders expect a higher level of disclosures from larger firms about their carbon 
performance and initiatives or strategies to limit the adverse effects of their business activities on 
the climate. Failure on the part of corporations to meet stakeholders‟ information need may cause 
stakeholders to doubt whether their interests are being served by corporate managers. This may, 
as stakeholder-agency theory suggests (Hill & Jones, 1992), give rise to the possibility of 
stakeholders‟ exit from the contractual relationships with corporate managers; in other words, 
stakeholders may withdraw critical resources from firms and thus threaten their survival. Larger 
companies, due to the exit threat of stakeholders and subsequent loss of access to critical 
resources, disclose more climate change-related information compared to smaller firms.  
5.3. Results of endogeneity test 
One would expect that EX_ASSUR might be influenced by FSIZE, PROF and LEV. We attempt 
to address this endogeneity problem by employing an instrumental variable in a two-stage least 
square regression. In the first stage, we regress EX_ASSUR on FSIZE, PROF and LEV and then 
store the residuals (RESID_EX_ASSUR). In the second stage, the residuals are used in the main 
regression model instead of the actual values of EX_ASSUR.  
The results of the endogeneity test, exhibited in Table 7, suggest that the coefficient of 
RESID_EX_ASSUR is still positive and statistically significant at 1% level. In addition, the Wu-
Hausman test confirms that there is no endogeneity problem in our analysis.  
5.4. Robustness test 
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For robustness check, the Tobit regression model has been employed. The Tobit regression can 
be utilized in this study as our dependent variable CCDS only ranges from 0 to 100 (Luo and 
Tang, 2014). 
The results of the Tobit regression are shown in Table 8. These findings mirror those reported in 
Table 6. For instance, EX_ASSUR remains highly significant at 1% level and its impact on the 
level of CCDS is still positive. In addition, FSIZE still has a significant positive effect on CCDS. 
One striking finding is the emergence of ASST_AGE as an influential variable that has a negative 
impact on CCDS (statistically significant at 1% level). Older assets cause more pollution than 
newer assets. Therefore, the age of assets is a proxy for corporate environmental performance 
(Cormier et al., 2005).  
The inverse relationship of ASST_AGE with CCDS indicates that firms with older assets (poor 
environmental performers) reveal more information relating to climate change compared with 
those with newer assets (better environmental performers). Since firms possessing older assets 
are more responsible for climate change (Liao et al., 2015), they are under greater stakeholder 
scrutiny (Patten, 2002b). Consequently, stakeholders expect a higher level of climate change-
related disclosures from these firms. Stakeholder-agency theory (Hill & Jones, 1992) suggests 
that firms that are greater contributors to climate change (because of their poor environmental 
performance) may jeopardize their survival by failing to meet the information need of 
stakeholders because such failure may cause stakeholders to withdraw critical resources from 
these firms. Hence, firms with poor environmental performance in terms of actions against 
climate change (e.g., initiatives for reducing GHG emissions, initiatives for improving energy 
efficiency, use of clean energy sources etc.) are more likely to disclose a higher level of climate 
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change-related information. This finding is consistent with earlier studies (e.g., Clarkson et al., 
2008; Stanny & Ely, 2008).   
We observe further that the R
2
 statistic amounts to 60%. Our results are robust as they are not 
sensitive to the models used.   
5.5. Additional tests 
5.5.1. Logit regression analysis for the period 2016-2018 
As mentioned earlier, our sample period ends in 2015 due to the fact that the CDP has migrated 
from the number score system to the letter score system in 2016 (CDP, 2016). From 2016, the 
responding companies, based on their assessment across four consecutive levels namely, (a) 
disclosure; (b) awareness; (c) management; and (d) leadership, are awarded any of the eight 
letter scores that range from A to D- (CDP, 2016). According to the new scoring system, a 
company receiving A or A- will be in the Leadership level and on the other hand, a company 




For the period 2016-2018, we estimate the ordered logit regression model to examine the impact 
of EX_ASSUR on the level of CCDS. The number of firm-year observations amounts to 67 for 
the ordered logit regression. We have adopted this model, as the observed dependent variable 
(i.e., CCDS) takes different values representing ordered or raked categories
11
. We define our 
dependent variable CCDS as follows: 
                                                          
10
 Please see Appendix A for more details.  
11
 Giannarakis et al. (2018) also employ the ordered logistic regression approach.  
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The results of our additional analyses are exhibited in Table 9. These findings are also in line 
with those reported in Table 6. For instance, EX_ASSUR exerts a positive impact on the level of 
CCDS and such effect remains statistically significant at 1% level. Besides, the coefficient of 
FSIZE is positive and weakly significant at 10% level. Overall, the findings of various regression 
analyses lead to the conclusion that there exists a positive linkage between EX_ASSUR and the 
level of CCDS, which suggests that companies having their environmental information externally 
assured seem to have a higher level of corporate climate change disclosures than those which 
have not. Hence, our results are robust as the analyses based on different sample periods lead to 
the same conclusion.  
5.5.2. Impact of ‘type of assurance provider’ and ‘type of financial auditor’  
Carbon assurance is part of the broad-ranging sustainability assurance (Datt et al., 2019). Like 
the sustainability assurance market, the carbon assurance market is also comprised of two types 
of assurance providers (APs): accounting firms (ACCFs that include Big4 (KPMG, 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, Ernst & Young and Deloitte)and other financial auditors) and non-
accounting firms (NACCFs that include, for example, specialist consulting firms) (Green et al., 
2017; Wong et al., 2016; Zhou et al., 2016; Cohen & Simnett, 2015; Green & Taylor, 2013; 
Huggins et al., 2011).  
These two groups of APs differ in expertise (Wong et al., 2016). For instance, ACCFs do not 
have specific scientific and engineering knowledge required for providing carbon and/or 
Page 33 of 71 
 
sustainability assurance (Green et al., 2017; Huggins et al., 2011; Delfgaauw, 2000) but they 
have a greater level of experience of providing assurance services. On the contrary, NACCFs 
have requisite knowledge and skills to provide GHG and/or sustainability assurance but they lack 
sufficient experience of providing assurance services. This important difference allows 
companies to choose between two types of APs (Green et al., 2017). But it is also noteworthy 
that Big4 accounting firms are currently controlling the sustainability assurance market 
(Fernandez-Feijoo et al., 2018; KPMG, 2013; Suddaby et al., 2007). Furthermore, it is evident 
from the existing literature that the level of sustainability disclosure is higher when the AP is a 
Big4 accounting firm (Fernandez-Feijoo et al., 2018; Zorio et al., 2013). 
Therefore, in this section, we further our analysis by investigating the impact of two more 
variables on the level of climate change disclosure of assured firms. One of them is the „Type of 
Assurance Provider‟ indicated by ASSUR_PRVDR, which is coded 1 for companies that have 
their carbon emissions disclosures assured by an ACCF (e.g., a Big4 or a non-Big4 financial 
auditor) and 0 for companies that purchase assurance from an NACCF (e.g., a specialist 
consulting firm). The second one is „Type of Financial Auditor‟ represented by BIG4, which 
takes the value of 1 for companies that have hired one of the Big4 financial auditors to assure 
their carbon emissions disclosures and 0 otherwise. To serve this purpose, we estimate the 
following regression model:  
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Table 10 and Table 11 display the estimates of this analysis suggesting that neither 
ASSUR_PRVDR nor BIG4 has any impact on CCDS as the parameters are found to be 
insignificant at conventional levels. These results are consistent with the Moroney et al. (2012) 
study that reports no association between the level of environmental disclosure and type of APs. 
But the outcomes contradict those reported by Fernandez-Feijoo et al. (2018) and Zorio et al. 
(2013) that confirm higher levels of sustainability disclosure when such disclosure is assured by 
a Big4 financial auditor. 
5.5.3. Impact of industry dummies  
So far, our empirical analyses show that the variable „Industry (IND)‟ does not exert any 
significant effects on CCDS. It is worth mentioning that IND has been used as a dichotomous 
variable, taking the value of 1 if a company operates in a highly polluting industry and 0 
otherwise. Now, in order to check the robustness of this finding, we classify the industry variable 
further and these new classifications include Financials (FIN), Consumer Discretionary 
(CONDIS), Consumer Staples (CONSTPL), Information Technology (IT), Telecommunications 
Services (TEL), Materials (MAT), Industrials (INDUST), Utilities (UTL), and Energy (NRG). 
Given that the number of observations appears to be very few for FIN, CONSTPL, TEL, UTL 
and NRG sectors, these segments form a new category named „Others‟, which is used as a 
reference category. We then estimate the following regression to observe the impacts of these 
new industry dummies on CCDS: 
                                                                     
                                                                  
                                                                                                                        (3) 
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Table 12 displays the estimates of Equation 3. It is evident from these findings that all the 
industry dummies except for CONDIS are found to be insignificant at conventional levels. 
CONDIS, however, appears to be significant only at 10% level. The results also reveal that 
EX_ASSUR and FSIZE still remain significant at 1% and 5% levels of significance, 
respectively. The finding that industry dummies have little or no impact on corporate climate 
change disclosures could be attributed to the fact that our sample includes companies from 
various sectors a positive effect in one industry may be cancelled out by a negative effect in 
another. Notably, this result is in line with Braam et al. (2016) who also document that industry 
dummies do not affect environmental performances. 
6. Conclusion and Policy Implications  
With the growing public awareness and concern about the global climate change, the demand for 
disclosure of information about climate change risks and climate change mitigation strategies by 
companies is also increasing. In order to enhance the reliability and credibility of the information 
reported and thus win stakeholders‟ confidence and subsequently build corporate reputation, 
companies are increasingly inclined to have their environmental information assured by 
independent assurance providers. While external assurance seems to impact the level of 
corporate climate change disclosures significantly, investigations of such association have not 
received much attention from researchers. In order to fill this vacuum in the existing literature, 
this research, using the lens of stakeholder-agency theory, examines the effect of external 
assurance on the extent of corporate climate change disclosures by Finnish firms.  
The findings of our empirical analysis suggest that firms that have their environmental 
information externally assured have a higher level of climate change disclosures than firms that 
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have not purchased such assurance. In other words, external assurance has a significant positive 
impact on the level of corporate climate change disclosures. A probable explanation for such an 
association between external assurance and the level of corporate climate change disclosures can 
be found in stakeholder-agency theory, which suggests that different institutional structures, 
referred to as monitoring structures, evolve in response to the tackling of the problem of 
information asymmetry between corporate managers and other stakeholders; in the context of 
corporate climate change disclosures, external assurance plays the role of such  monitoring 
structure. As an effective monitoring structure, external assurance can improve companies‟ 
climate change-related data collection processes, can discover material errors in and omissions of 
the climate change-related information prepared, can prevent companies from manipulating 
diffusion of carbon information and thus can increase the level of corporate climate change 
disclosures (Hodge et al., 2009), which may potentially result in the reduction of information 
asymmetry between corporate managers and other stakeholders as far as climate change-related 
information is concerned. A number of control variables are used in this study and among them, 
mainly firm size and asset age are found to have significant effects on the level of corporate 
climate change disclosures.  
The results of this study have implications for managers, investors, policy makers and regulators. 
By using the results of this research, corporate managers will be able to reduce the information 
asymmetry between various stakeholders and them through disclosure of accurate, reliable and 
credible environmental information. Such disclosures will, in turn, allow socially responsible 
investors to choose eco-friendly investments and will thus enable them to make appropriate 
investment decisions. Standardized carbon reports, which are produced in the presence of 
mandatory carbon reporting requirements, can provide extensive and reliable carbon information 
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necessary for making investment decisions. Therefore, the findings of this study have 
implications for public policy-makers who may, in the absence of mandatory reporting 
requirements, develop standards for reporting corporate climate change-related information. 
Finally, the results of this study are important for regulators, who may serve as a watchdog on 
the transparency of firms‟ voluntary climate change-related disclosures. In case of companies‟ 
failure to disseminate accurate, reliable and credible climate change-related information, 
regulators may develop stringent rules and regulations to ensure that reliable disclosures are 
made by companies. 
This research is subject to certain limitations. First, the source of the data used in this research is 
the CDP database which has limitations in that it is a voluntary disclosure process where all the 
observations collected are self-reported by the responding firms. This may bias the reported 
findings. Second, our sample includes only listed companies and hence the results might have 
limited explanatory capacity for unlisted firms. Third, the sample includes only the companies 
that have published sustainability reports. Fourth, this research is based solely upon Finnish data, 
which may inhibit the generalization of the findings in other contexts but this limitation can be 
overcome in future research by utilizing bigger samples that will include both local and 
international firms to provide greater understanding of how the voluntary adoption of external 
assurance affects the level of corporate climate change disclosures. Furthermore, country-
specific studies can also be conducted to facilitate the comparison of findings.  
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Table 1: Prior studies 
Panel A: Studies examining company specific determinants of corporate climate change disclosures 
Study Sample & Data Findings 
Chithambo & Tauringana, 2014. 
 
210 companies listed on the London Stock 
Exchange. Data relate to the year 2011. 
 
While larger firms having more financial slack and 
belonging to environmentally sensitive industries have a 
higher level of climate change disclosure, firms with high 
leverage tend to disclose less information. 
 
Eleftheriadis & Anagnostopoulou, 2015. 
 
47 firms listed on the Athens Stock 
Exchange. Data relate to the period 2008-
2011. 
 
Firm size and profitability have significant positive 
impact on the level of corporate climate change 
disclosure but industry type has insignificant impact on 
the same. 
 
Freedman & Jaggi, 2005. 
 
120 firms from 20 countries. Data relate to 
the year 2000. 
 
Larger firms belonging to environmentally sensitive 
industries disseminate more climate change information. 
In addition, firms domiciled in the countries that have 
ratified the Kyoto Protocol have higher level of global 
warming related disclosure compared to firms in other 
countries. 
 
Giannarakis et al., 2017. 
 
119 large firms listed on the London Stock 
Exchange. Data relate to the year 2014. 
 
Firms with better environmental performance have 
higher level of climate change disclosure. 
 
Giannarakis et al., 2018. 215 companies of Bloomberg European 
500 Index large firms listed on the London 
Stock Exchange. Data relate to the year 
2014. 
 
External assurance of environmental information 
increases the level of climate change disclosure. 
Moreover, firms with better environmental performance 
and a higher proportion of government ownership tend to 
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Table 1: Prior studies (Continued) 
Panel A: Studies examining company specific determinants of corporate climate change disclosures 
Study Sample & Data Findings 
Gonzales-Gonzales & Ramírez, 2016. 
 
82 Spanish companies that 
responded to the CDP (2012) 
questionnaire. Data relate to 
the year 2012. 
 
Larger firms with high financial risk are under high stakeholder 
pressures and tend to disclose more climate change-related 
information.  
 
Luo et al., 2012. 291 firms from the CDP 
Global 500 Report, 2009. Date 
relate to the year 2009. 
 
Larger companies are under more economic and institutional 
pressures and tend to disclose more information on carbon emissions.  
 
Prado-Lorenzo et al., 2009. 
 
101 largest firms from the 
USA, Canada, Australia and 
the EU. Data relate to the year 
2007. 
 
Firm size and market capitalization have been found to have 
significantly positive effect on the level of climate change disclosure.  
 
Stanny & Ely, 2008. 
 
494 listed US companies 
(chosen from S&P 500). 
 
Firm size, previous year's disclosures and foreign sales significantly 
and positively affect firms' decision to disclose climate change-
related information.  
 
Panel B: Studies examining the effect of corporate governance characteristics on corporate climate change disclosures 
Ben-Amar & McIlkenny, 
2015. 
559 firm-year observations from the 200 
firms covered in the CDP-Canada annual 
survey. Data relate to the period from 
2008 to 2011. 
There is a positive association between board effectiveness and the 
firm‟s carbon disclosure quality. 
Ben-Amar et al., 2017. 541 firm-year observations from the 200 
firms covered in the CDP Canada annual 
Survey. Data relate to the period 2008-
2014. 
The probability of voluntary climate change disclosure is higher for 
companies with a higher number of women on boards. 
Choi et al., 2013. The largest 100 companies listed on the 
Australian Securities Exchange. Data 
relate to the period from 2006 to 2008. 
The quality of corporate governance is a key driver for corporate 
climate change disclosures.  
Hossain et al., 2017. 1,175 firm-year observations from 331 
companies in 33 countries. Data relate to 
the period from 2011 to 2013.  
Firms with a higher number of women directors and a larger board 
tend to provide more carbon emissions information.   
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Table 1: Prior studies (Continued) 
Panel B: Studies examining the effect of corporate governance characteristics on corporate climate change disclosures 
Study Sample & Data Findings 
Jaggi et al., 2018. 671 firm-year observations from the 
firms listed on the Italian Stock 
Exchange. Data relate to the period from 
2010 to 2013. 
Existence of environmental committees, board independence and 
institutional shareholdings has a strong positive effect on firms‟ 
voluntary carbon disclosure decisions. The effect is even stronger for 
firms operating in highly polluting industries. 
Kılıç & Kuzey, 2018. 770 firm-year observations from 154 
companies listed on the Borsa Istanbul. 
Data relate to the period from 2011 to 
2015. 
Firms with a higher percentage of independent directors, a 
sustainability committee and a higher number of foreign directors are 
more likely to disclose carbon emissions information.    
Liao et al., 2015. 329 largest UK companies included in 
the 2011 CDP FTSE350 reports. 
The propensity and extent of disclosure of GHG information is higher 
for the firms that have a higher percentage of female directors on the 
board, greater board independence and an environmental committee. 
Rankin et al., 2011. 187 firms listed on the Australian Stock 
Exchange. Date relate to the year 2007. 
Larger companies having environmental management systems and 
higher corporate governance quality are likely to voluntarily 
disseminate information relating to climate change.  
Yunus et al., 2016. 893 firm-year observations from 200 
companies listed on the Australian 
Securities Exchange. Data relate to the 
period from 2008 to 2012. 
Firms having an environmental committee, larger board size, greater 
board independence and implementing an environmental management 
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2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Initial sample per year 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 296 
 
No. of yearly observations with 
missing data (18) (14) (13) (9) (4) (3) (1) (6) (68) 
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Table 3: Definitions of the variables used 
 
Variable   Definition 
CCDS 
 
CDP carbon disclosure score.  
EX_ASSUR 
 
A dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the sustainability or environmental report is externally assured and 0 otherwise.  
FSIZE 
 
Firm size is the logarithm of the firm's year-end total assets.  
PROF 
 
Profitability is the return on assets. 
LEV 
 
Leverage is the ratio of year-end total debt to year-end total equity.  
GRWTH 
 
Growth is the percentage of increase in yearly sales. 
ASST_AGE 
 
Asset age is the ratio of net property, plant and equipment to gross property, plant and equipment. 
RNDINT 
 
Research and development intensity is the ratio of research and development expenditure to net sales revenue. 
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean Maxi. Min. Std. Dev. 
CCDS 71.12           100.00                                        0.00 23.92 
EX_ASSUR 0.42   0.49 
FSIZE  6.42 7.58 5.19  0.57 
PROF 0.06 0.61 -0.09  0.07 
LEV 2.39 74.37  0.00 10.34 
ASST_AGE 0.40 0.72 0.17 0.12 
RNDINT  0.02 0.19 0.00 0.03 
GRWTH 0.01 0.69 -0.63 0.17 
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Table 5: Pearson correlations 
           
                     
 CCDS EX_ASSUR FSIZE PROF LEV  ASST_AGE  RNDINT  GRWTH  IND   
CCDS  1.000000          
            
           
EX_ASSUR 0.549869 1.000000         
 (0.0000)           
           
FSIZE 0.318284 0.381180 1.000000        
 (0.0000) (0.0000)          
           
PROF -0.102594 -0.192446 -0.209960 1.000000       
 (0.1884) (0.0130) (0.0066)         
           
LEV  0.040049 -0.011753 0.226670 -0.149904 1.000000      
 (0.6084) (0.8805) (0.0033) (0.0539)        
           
ASST_AGE  -0.222850 -0.104993 0.113830 0.000810 -0.050098 1.000000     
 (0.0039) (0.1782) (0.1442) (0.9917) (0.5215)       
           
RNDINT  0.199381 0.209479 0.069156 0.030026 -0.100403 -0.211933 1.000000    
 (0.0100) (0.0068) (0.3760) (0.7010) (0.1981) (0.0061)      
           
GRWTH -0.065195 -0.036966 -0.108028 0.057027 -0.001880 0.114207 -0.133757 1.000000   
 (0.4040) (0.6363) (0.1659) (0.4655) (0.9808) (0.1429) (0.0858)    
           
IND  0.061175 0.025662 0.226897 -0.254534 0.118028 0.212988 -0.472469 0.026627 1.000000  
 (0.4337) (0.7428) (0.0033) (0.0009) (0.1299) (0.0059) (0.000) (0.7335)    
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Table 6: Regression results 
Dependent variable CCDS 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-Statistic p-value 
Intercept 7.91 30.73 0.26 0.79 
EX_ASSUR 24.32*** 3.39 7.17 0.00 
FSIZE 9.80* 5.01 1.96 0.06 
PROF -9.67 20.65 -0.46 0.64 
LEV -0.11 0.245 -0.45 0.64 
ASST_AGE -27.44 16.65 -1.64 0.11 
RNDINT 61.32 83.36 0.73 0.46 
GRWTH 3.94 7.15 0.55 0.58 
IND 1.88 6.70 0.28 0.77 
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Table 7: Results of endogeneity test 
Dependent variable CCDS 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-Statistic p-value 
Intercept -46.20 31.03 -1.49 0.13 
RESID_EX_ASSUR 24.86*** 3.36 7.39 0.00 
FSIZE 19.07*** 4.93 3.87 0.00 
PROF -12.57 20.41 -0.62 0.53 
LEV -0.15 0.25 -0.63 0.53 
ASST_AGE -26.64 16.69 -1.60 0.11 
RNDINT 95.16 82.39 1.16 0.25 
GRWTH 4.68 7.08 0.66 0.51 
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Table 8: Results of Tobit model 
Dependent variable CCDS 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error z-Statistic p-value 
Intercept 32.59* 18.71 1.74 0.08 
EX_ASSUR 22.27*** 3.41 6.53 0.00 
FSIZE 5.82* 3.06 1.90 0.06 
PROF 14.62 21.88 0.67 0.50 
LEV 0.02 0.15 0.12 0.90 
ASST_AGE -38.39*** 13.08 -2.94 0.00 
RNDINT 76.13 52.48 1.45 0.14 
GRWTH -0.23 8.80 -0.03 0.97 
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Table 9: Results of ordered logit regression analysis for the period 2016-2018 
Dependent variable CCDS 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error z-Statistic p-value 
Threshold of the dependent variable   
 
 
2 – Band C or C-  2.47 2.42 1.02 0.31 
3 – Band B or B-  3.83 2.42 1.58 0.11 
4 – Band A or A-  4.86** 2.43 2.00 0.05 
Independent and control variables   
 
 
EX_ASSUR 1.11*** 0.36 3.09 0.00 
FSIZE 0.63* 0.37 1.73 0.08 
PROF 0.001 5.03 0.00 0.99 
LEV -0.24 0.47 -0.51 0.61 
ASST_AGE 0.24 1.01 0.24 0.81 
RNDINT 1.81 5.14 0.35 0.72 
GRWTH -1.53 0.96 -1.59 0.11 




LR-statistic 26.19***  
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Table 10: Impact of Type of Assurance Provider and Type of Financial Auditor (OLS regression) 
Dependent variable CCDS 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-Statistic p-value 
Intercept 58.38 39.71 1.47 0.15 
ASSUR_PRVDR -6.87 11.58 -0.59 0.55 
BIG4 14.31 11.07 1.29 0.20 
FSIZE 6.09 6.43 0.94 0.35 
PROF 34.87 39.60 0.88 0.38 
LEV -0.05 0.28 -0.19 0.84 
ASST_AGE -44.26 26.82 -1.64 0.11 
RNDINT -11.07 92.81 -0.11 0.91 
GRWTH 6.07 9.86 0.61 0.54 
IND -1.36 10.34 -0.13 0.89 
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Table 11: Impact of Type of Assurance Provider and Type of Financial Auditor (Logit regression) 
Dependent variable CCDS 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error z-Statistic p-value 
Threshold of the dependent variable   
 
 
2 – Band C or C-  7.15* 3.82 1.87 0.06 
3 – Band B or B-  5.30 5.78 0.91 0.36 
4 – Band A or A-  7.33 5.85 1.25 0.21 
Independent and control variables   
 
 
ASSUR_PRVDR 0.97 1.47 0.66 0.50 
BIG4 1.08 1.26 0.85 0.39 
FSIZE 0.81 0.79 1.03 0.30 
PROF -5.73 12.24 -0.46 0.64 
LEV -0.66 1.02 -0.64 0.51 
ASST_AGE 2.07 2.86 0.72 0.46 
RNDINT 1.89 10.26 0.18 0.85 
GRWTH 0.19 3.43 0.06 0.95 




LR-statistic 24.88***  
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Table 12: Effects of industry dummies 
Dependent variable CCDS 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-Statistic p-value 
Intercept -11787.19*** 888.44 -13.27 0.00 
EX_ASSUR 7.16*** 2.69 2.65 0.00 
FSIZE 10.75** 4.68 2.30 0.02 
PROF -23.32 14.35 -1.62 0.11 
LEV -0.04 0.21 -0.20 0.83 
ASST_AGE -18.12 12.67 -1.42 0.15 
RNDINT -122.62 84.30 -1.45 0.14 
GRWTH 0.57 4.82 0.11 0.90 
Industry dummies     
CONDIS -19.54 10.08 -1.93 0.06 
MAT -4.75 9.20 -0.51 0.60 
IT 14.76 13.21 1.12 0.26 
INDUST -7.85 9.01 -0.87 0.38 
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Appendix A 
The final letter grade that a particular company receives is awarded based on the score obtained 
in the highest achieved level. For example, if company XYZ achieves 88% in Disclosure level, 
76% in Awareness level and 65% in Management level, it will finally receive a letter grade of B. 
If a company obtains less than 40% in its highest achieved level, its letter score will have a 
minus sign. For example, if company ABC achieves 76% in Disclosure level and 38% in 
Awareness level, it will finally receive a letter grade of C-. Note that a company must achieve 
over 75% in Leadership to be eligible for an A and thus be part of the A List, which represents 
the highest scoring companies. This is how the companies get ranked. Table A1 displays this 
ranking system.  
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Table A2: Regression results with Lagged EX_ASSUR 
Dependent variable CCDS 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-Statistic p-value 
Intercept 5.88 31.95 0.18 0.85 
Lagged EX_ASSUR     20.57*** 3.41 6.02 0.00 
FSIZE 11.23** 5.16 2.17 0.03 
PROF -16.05 20.53 -0.78 0.43 
LEV -0.13 0.24 -0.52 0.59 
ASST_AGE -30.44* 17.03 -1.78 0.07 
RNDINT 53.30 83.77 0.63 0.53 
GRWTH 5.97 7.59 0.78 0.43 
IND -0.54 6.81 -0.08 0.96 





Notes: This table present the estimates obtained from the following model 
                                                                       
                                                                        
 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10. 
 
